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NOTES AND COMMENT

hard Stern and Son v. Bodden3 holds that if the rule of taxation is
uniform, proper classification may be made and different rates applied
to each class. Classification, however, must be based upon substantial
distinction which make real differences, is the ruling of Kily v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co.4 The state can tax all privileges
or select certain classes leaving others untaxed. Beals v. State.5 In the
case of Pick v. Rubicon Hydraulic Co., the court held that the legislature can impose other restrictions upon corporations as to method of
acquiring easements, than those applied to individuals.
LEwis I. CoaL-N

Taxation: State Taxation of Federal Agencies and Instrumentalities.
The application of the doctrine prohibiting state interference with
the agencies and the instrumentalities of the federal government has
been greatly enlarged by two recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Both of the cases were decided by a divided court,
and it would seem from a summary review of the decided cases and
the principles therein enunciated that the limits of the application of
this doctrine are reached in this type of case.
The first of these cases is that of Long v. Rockford, 48 S.Ct. 463,
in which it was held that royalties for use of patents cannot be taxed
by the states. The argument being, that the primary object in granting
and securing the monopoly to the inventor was the benefit to the public
and community at large and secondarily to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. That the patent is the instrument by which
that end is accomplished, and like a franchise granted by the United
States is not subject to state taxation. If the state "cannot tax the
.patent, it cafnnot tax the royalties received from its use."
The second case arose under a law enacted by the state of Mississippi providing that dealers in gasoline shall pay for the privilege of
engaging in such business an excise tax of a designated amount per
gallon upon the sale of gasoline. Defendant company sold gas to the
United States Government for use in operation of Coast Guard fleet
and Veteran's IHospital. The company defended the action brought
to-recover taxes levied on this sale with the contention that the tax
was void since it was an interference with the instrumentalities of the
federal government. This view was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Panhandlev. State of Mississippi, 48 S.Ct. 451. Quoting Mr. Justice
4

165 Wis. 75.
142 W. 154.
139 W. 544.
27 W. 433.
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Butler, "A charge at the prescribed rate is made on account of every
gallon required by the United States. It is immaterial that the seller
and not the purchaser is required to report and make payment to the
state. Sale and purchase constitute a transaction by which the tax is
measured and on which the burden rests. The amount of money
claimed by the state rises and falls precisely as does the quantity of
gasoline so secured by the government. It depends immediate upon
the number of gallons. The necessary operation of these enactments
when so construed is directly to retard, impede and burden the exertion
by the United States of its constitutional powers to operate the fleet
and the hospital."
That the state has no right to tax any of the constitutional means
employed by the federal government to execute its constitutional
powers, and no power by taxation or otherwise to retard, impede,
burden or in any other manner control the operation of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into effect the powers vested
in the national government are principles so well established as to be
regarded now as fundamental and elementary. There are no express
constitutional restrictions upon the states, except such as are involved
in the exclusive power over foreign commerce and concurrent power
in internal taxation given to Congress. By judicial construction from
the necessary relation between the power of state taxation and the
supremacy of the federal authority this doctrine has been evolved. It
was first announced by Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated case of
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. Therein it was held that the
state could not without violating the constitution tax the notes of an
United States Bank established within that state.
The language of Marshall has become classical, "That the power
to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy and
defeat may render useless the power to create; that there is a plain
repugnance in conferring on one government a power to control the
constitutional measures of another which other with respect to those
very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts control."
In a later case,' Marshall applied the rule to prevent state taxation
obstructing or defeating the federal power to regulate commerce. The
manifold application of the doctrine will be observed by a review of
the following cases in which state taxation has been held invalid; a
tax upon United States securities, 2 salaries of United States officials,3
'Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.
'Weston v. Charleston, 2 Peters 435.
'Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Peters 435.
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upon interstate passengers, 4 lands and other property of the United
States, 5 lands held by Indians, under patents issued by virtue of
treaties made with their tribes,, railroad franchises granted by the
United States,7 the incorporeal right secured by patent as distinguished
from the product."
The following cases demonstrated the application of the doctrine
where the interference with the federal government was more remote.
9
In the case of Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R. v. Harrison where the Federal
Government under a contract with the Indian tribes was obliged to
operate a coal mine, it was held that a lessee from the Government is
an intrumentality of the United States and cannot be subjected to an
occupation or privilege tax by the state. Under a similar set of facts,
0
the Supreme Court held in Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma' that the lessee
being a Federal instrumentality, the state could not tax its interest in
the leases. But in Gillespie v. Oklahoma" the Supreme Court went
much further and held that a lessee of restricted Creek and Osage
lands is in effect an instrumentality used by the United States in fulfilling its duties to the Indians, and that therefore the net income
derived by such lessee from sales of his share of oil and gas received
under the lease, could not be taxed by the state.
The cases upon this subject are not in harmony. Nor can all be
reconciled. The most that can be said is that there is a distinct tendency manifested to hold invalid all interferences with the property,
agencies, obligations and officers of the Federal Government.
It is apparent that the application of the recognized principles to the
manifold situations that arise out of the exercise of their powers by the
two sovereigns does of necessity in some instances present considerable
difficulty. The broad language of Marshall in McCulluch v. Virginia
has unfortunately been the cause of the application of the doctrine to
situations where the interference with the Federal Government has
been very remote.
The power to tax may be the power to destroy, yet this maxim cannot be applied to its logical conclusion. In the minutest analysis every
state tax effects or diminishes the subject of federal taxation, and from
the very necessities of the situations presented by two sovereignties

' Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35.

Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 5I1.
'Case of Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737.
' California v. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 3
' Weber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344.
r Van
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having the same territorial limits but with different jurisdictional
spheres the proper functioning of either in raising revenues will at
times indirectly affect the other. "It cannot be that a state tax which
remotely affects the efficient exercise of a Federal power is for that
reason inhibited by the Constitution. To hold that would deny to the
' 12
Nor should it be an
states all power to tax persons and property.
government may
one
by
levied
a
tax
that
principle
invasion of this
other.
by
the
eventually be borne
The rule is well established that in order for a tax by one government to invade the province of the other, it must directly and immediately constitute a burden upon the latter's governmental function.
The two inquiries therefore common to all cases should be first, whether
the tax imposed by the state does in fact invade the domain of the
Federal Government, and secondly whether the extent or the manner
of the interference renders it unwarranted.
Now with these principles in mind the extreme consequences resulting from the late decisions of the Supreme Court in Long v. Rockwood
and Panhandle v. M11ississippi are more apparent. Justice Holmes
writes the dissenting opinion in both cases. In the Rockwood case
Holmes takes issue with the statement that patents are instrumentalities
of the Federal Government, for he says, "they are used by the
patentees for their private advantage alone" and that "the most that
can be said is that a tax is a discouragement so far as it goes, and
to that extent in its immediate operation runs counter to the government intent." And in the Panhandle case speaking of the analogy of
a tax or commodities sold to the Federal Government with that affecting interstate commerce, "But obviously it does not follow from the
invalidity of a tax directly burdening interstate commerce that a tax
upon a domestic seller is bad because he may be able to shift the burden
to a purchaser, even though an agency of the Government, who is
willing to pay the price with the tax and who has no rational ground
for demanding favor. I am not aware that the President, the Members
of Congress, the Judiciary, or to come nearer to the case at hand, the
coast guard or the officials of the Veterans' Hospital because they are
instrumentalities of the government and cannot function naked and
unfed, hitherto having been entitled to have their bills for food and
clothing cut down so far as their butchers and tailors have been taxed
on their sales."
The interference in either of these cases is certainly not immediate,
in the one instance the tax is levied on the patentee, and the second on
the domestic seller. It is true that in each instance there may be some
Unzion Pac. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5.
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slight effect upon the Federal agency or instrumentality, yet with due
deference they seem extremely remote.
As Justice Holmes points out, the power to tax is not the power to
destroy as long as the United States Supreme Court sits with power
to prevent an abuse of such privilege. In those cases where the only
objection to the tax is that it remofely effects the functions of the
Federal Government, it would be better to regulate such taxation
rather than prohibit it entirely. In any event it is apparent that these
two late cases materially enlarge the application of the doctrine, if not
beyond its proper scope, certainly beyond the limits previously recognized.
CARL R. BECKER

